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ABSTRACT 
 
ANALYSIS OF FINANCING PATTERN OF THE CHINESE AUTOMOBILE 
INDUSTRY 
By 
LI, Zhi-Gang 
 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to look into the pattern of financing and capital structure 
theory, then apply to the financing pattern and the capital structure-the optimal capital 
structure. Some micro-factors and macro-factors of optimal capital structure will been 
analyzed.  
This study will focus on Chinese automobile industry under some hypotheses in 
which identifying some key determinants of the capital structure. Through analyzing 
current financing pattern of automobile industry and capital structure, intend to seek 
optimal capital structure and financing pattern for Chinese automobile industry, 
provide micro-countermeasure and macro-countermeasure for optimum seeking 
company capital structure. 
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This study also intends to highlight the major characteristics of the Chinese 
financial system and market, and discuss corporate financing and investment 
behaviors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate financing, capital budgeting and dividend policy composes the corporate 
finance. Corporate financing is one of very important part. From the corporate internal 
financing points of view, dividend policy also can be regarded as one of the corporate 
financing decisions. Financing is not only precondition of corporate existence, but 
also the base of corporate development. Every corporation should make much account 
for financing problem. We analyze the financing pattern, and its main purpose is how 
to control financial risk, then to establish reasonable capital structure, and ultimately, 
to lower the financing cost and to increase the corporate value.       
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II. The Theory of Financing Pattern and Capital Structure  
 
A. The financing Pattern 
Financing is one of the most basic activities of corporate finance, is a series of finance 
function, and is a very complicated financial activity. 
We can divide financing pattern into internal financing and external financing by 
financing sources. 
Internal financing comes from internally generated cash flow and it’s defined as net 
income plus depreciation minus dividends. External financing is net new debt and 
new shares of equity net of buybacks. 
When we make financing decision, we should fully consider relevant factors 
discussed in the following sections to decide suitable financing channel. From a 
financial point of view, the main differences between debt and equity are the 
following: 
z Debt is not the ownership interest in the firm. Creditors do not usually have 
voting power. The device used by creditors to protect themselves is the loan 
contract, that is indenture. 
z The corporation’s payment of interest on debt is considered a cost of doing 
business and is fully tax-deductible. Thus interest expense is paid out to creditors 
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before the corporate tax liability is computed. Dividends on common and 
preferred stock are paid to shareholders after the tax liability has been determined. 
The government is providing a direct tax subsidy on the use of debt when 
compared to equity. 
z Unpaid debt is a liability of the firm. If it is not paid, the creditors can legally 
claim the assets of the firm. This action may result in liquidation and bankruptcy. 
Thus one of the costs of issuing debt is the possibility of financial failure, which 
does not arise when equity is issued.  
1. Internal Financing 
Firms raise capital internally by retaining the earnings they generate and by obtaining 
external funds from the capital markets. In the aggregate, the percentage of total 
investment funds that U.S. firms generate internally-essentially retained earnings plus 
depreciation-is generally in the 40-80 percent range. Thus, internal cash flows are 
typically insufficient to meet the total capital needs of most firms.1 
2. External Financing: Debt vs. Equity.   
There are two basic sources of outside financing, which are debt and equity. Debt is 
the most frequently used source of outside capital. The important distinctions between 
                                            
1 Mark Grinblatt and Sheridan Titman. Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy. 2nd 
Edition, McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2002.     
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debt and equity are that debt claims are senior to equity claims; and that the interest 
payments on debt claims are tax deductible, but dividends on equity claims are not. 
1) Sources of short-term Financing  
Short-term credit is defined as any liability originally scheduled for payment within 
one year. There are numerous sources of short-term funds. 
z Accruals   
Continually recurring short-term liabilities, such as wages and taxes that increase 
spontaneously with the size of business operations. However, a firm ordinarily cannot 
control its accruals in terms of timing, thus, firms try to make a full use of all the 
accruals they can, but they have little control over the levels of these accounts. 
Account payable is the credit created when one firm buys on credit from another firm. 
Firms generally make purchases from other firms on credits, recording the debt as an 
account payable. This type of financing, called trade credit, is the largest single 
category of short-term debt, representing about 40 percent of the current liabilities for 
the average non-financial corporation in the US.2 Accounts payable is a spontaneous 
source of financing in the sense that it arises from ordinary business transactions.  
 
                                            
2  J. Fred Weston, Scott Besley and Eugene F.Brigham Essentials of Managerial 
Finance. Eleventh Edition, 2002. 
 
 10 
z Short-term Bank Loans  
Commercial banks are second in importance to trade credit as a source of short-term 
financing. The influence of banks actually is greater than it appears from the dollar 
amounts they lend because banks provide non-spontaneous funds. As a firm’s 
financing needs increase, it specifically requests additional funds from its bank. If the 
request is denied, the firm might be forced to abandon attractive growth opportunities. 
z Commercial Paper 
Commercial paper is a type of unsecured promissory note issued by large firms, and it 
is sold primarily to other business firms, insurance companies, pension funds, money 
market mutual funds, and banks. Commercial paper is called a discount instrument 
because it is sold at a price below its face, or maturity value. So, the cost of using 
commercial paper as a source of financing is computed the same as for a discount 
interest loan. 
z Use of Security in short-term Financing 
Commercial paper never is secured, but all other types of loans can be secured if this 
is deemed necessary or desirable. Several different kinds of collateral can be 
employed, including marketable securities, land or buildings, equipment, inventory, 
and accounts receivable. Marketable securities make excellent collateral, but few 
firms that need loans also hold such portfolios. Similarly, real property and equipment 
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are good forms of collateral, but they generally are used as security form long-term 
loans rather than form working capital loans. Therefore, most secured short-term 
business borrowing involves the use of accounts receivable and inventories as 
collateral.  
2) Sources of long-term Financing 
z Common Stock 
Common stock is a share of ownership in a corporation that usually entitles its holders 
to vote on the corporation’s affairs. Common stock financing offers several 
advantages to the corporation. Common stock does not legally obligate the firm to 
make payments to stockholders; it carries no fixed maturity date; if a company’s 
prospects look bright, then common stock often can be sold on better terms than debt; 
the sale of common stock generally increases the creditworthiness of the firm. 
Disadvantages associated with issuing common stock include the following: the sale 
of common stock gives some voting rights to new stockholders; the new stockholders 
will share the bonanza; the cost of underwriting and distributing common stock 
usually are higher than those for debt or preferred stock; under current tax laws, 
common stock dividends are not deductible as an expense for tax purpose, but bond 
interest is deductible. 
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From a social viewpoint, common stock is a desirable form of financing since it 
makes businesses less vulnerable to the consequences of declines in sales and earning. 
Equity-holders take the limited liability of firms within how much equity they own. 
After paying off the interests of debt, equity-holders enjoy the residual claims from 
firms. Voting rights is a typical character of equity shares. The more equity shares the 
greater voting rights to firm.    
z Preferred Stock  
Preferred stock is a financial instrument that gives its holders a claim on a firm’s 
earnings that must be paid before dividends on its common stock can be paid.3 
Preferred stock also is a senior claim in the event of reorganization or liquidation. 
However, the claims of preferred stockholders are always junior to the debt holders’. 
Preferred stock is used much less than common stock as a source of capital. Preferred 
stock is like debt in that its dividend is fixed at the time of sale. In some cases, 
preferred stock has a maturity date much like a bond. In other cases, preferred stock is 
more like common stock in that it never matures. Preferred shares are almost always 
cumulative. Preferred stockholders do not always have voting rights, but they often 
obtain voting rights when the preferred dividends are suspended. 
                                            
3  See Mark Grinblatt and Sheridan Titman, “Financial Markets and Corporate 
Strategy”, 2nd Edition, McGraw-Hill Irwin, pp.70 
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z Warrants  
Warrants are long-term call options on the issuing firm’s stock. Call options give their 
holders the right to buy shares of the firm at a pre-specified price for a given period of 
time. These options are often included as part of a unit offering, which includes tow 
or more securities offered as a package.  
z Term Loans 
A term loan is a contract under which a borrower agrees to make a series of interest 
and principal payments on specific dates to the lender. Term loans usually are 
negotiated directly between the borrowing firm and a financial institution-generally a 
bank, an insurance company, or a pension fund. 
Term loans have three major advantages over public offerings-speed, flexibility, and 
low issuance costs. The interest rate on a term loan can be either fixed for the life of 
the loan or variable. 
z Corporate Bonds   
Corporate bond is a long-term contract under which a borrower agrees to make 
payments of interest and principal on specific dates to the holder of the bond. 
Although bonds traditionally have been issued with maturity of between 20 and 30 
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years, in recent year’s shorter maturity, such as 7 to 10 years, have been used to an 
increasing extent. 4 
z Mortgage Bonds 
Mortgage bond is a bond backed by fixed assets. That is, with a mortgage bond, the 
corporation pledges certain assets as security for the bond. First mortgage bonds are 
senior in priority to claims of second mortgage bonds. All mortgage bonds are written 
subject to an indenture, which is a legal document that spells out in detail the rights of 
both the bondholders and the corporation.  
z Debentures 
Debenture is a long-term bond that is not secured by a mortgage on specific property. 
A debenture is an unsecured bond, and as such it provides no lien against specific 
property as security for the obligation. In practice, the usage of debentures depends 
both on the nature of the firm’s assets and on its general credit strength.  
z Subordinated debentures 
Subordinated debenture is a bond having a claim on assets only after the senior debt 
has been paid off in the event of liquidation. 
 
 
                                            
4 J. Fred Weston, Scott Besley and Eugene F.Brigham, “ Essentials of Managerial 
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z Other Types of Bonds 
Several other types of bonds are used sufficiently often to warrant mention. Such as 
convertible bonds, income bonds, and putable bonds, and so on. 
z Leases  
A lease can be viewed as a debt instrument in which the owner of an asset, the lessor, 
gives the right to use the asset to another party, the lessee, in return for a set of 
contractually fixed payments. Leasing is often motivated by tax considerations.  
B. Capital Structure Theories 
In general, a firm can choose among various alternative capital structures. In other 
words, a firm can choose the different debt-equity ratio. One of the most perplexing 
issues facing financial managers is the choice of optimal capital structure, which is the 
mix of debt and equity financing.  This section focuses on the theoretical discussions 
of corporate capital structure decisions. 
Until 1958, capital structure theory consisted of loose assertions about investor 
behavior rather than carefully constructed models that could be tested by formed 
statistical analysis. In what has been called the most influential set of financial papers 
ever published by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (MM) addressed capital 
                                                                                                                            
Finance”, Eleventh Edition, The Dryden Press, 1996 
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structure in a rigorous, scientific fashion, and they set off a chain of research that 
continues to this day.5 
1. MM Model without Taxes 
Under certain assumptions, capital structure is irrelevant to firm’s value, i.e. VL= VU,    
Here VL designates the value of leveraged firm and VU designates the value of 
unlevered firm. 
Assumptions behind MM model are the following6: 
z No personal or corporate income taxes 
 In reality, tax deduction of interest payment different rates applied to dividends, 
capital gains, and interests.  
z EBT is not affected by capital structure and constant (zero growth) 
Obviously, this assumption is not true in reality. Furthermore, the high debt level 
would induce financial distress.  
z No brokerage costs and identical borrowing rates for individuals and institutions. 
In reality, existence of brokerage costs and different borrowing rates is a fact.  
z Firm’s choice of capital structure does not convey information to the market.  
There exists agency problem and information asymmetry in the real world.7  
                                            
5 Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment,” American Economic Review, June 1958. 
6  Eugene F. Brigham, Louis C.Gapenski, and Michael C.Ehrhardt. Financial 
Management. Fort Worth: the Dryden Press, 1999. 
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MM used an arbitrage proof to support their proposition. They showed that, under 
their assumptions, if two companies differed only in the way they are financed and in 
their total market values, and then investors would sell shares of the higher-valued 
firm, buy those of the lower-valued firms, and continue this process until the 
companies had exactly the same market value. So in the absence of transaction of 
costs and based on the assumption that investment is fixed, the values of two firms 
should be equal by arbitrage.  
Implication behind the MM model without taxes:  
The weighted average cost of capital to the firm is completely independent of its 
capital structure. 
The weighted average cost of capital for the firm, regardless of the amount of debt it 
uses, is equal to the cost of equity it would have if it used no debt. 
The inclusion of more debt in the capital structure will not increase the value of the 
firms, since the benefits of cheaper debt will be exactly offset by an increase in the 
riskiness, hence in the cost, of its equity.  
                                                                                                                            
7 To be discussed further on the agency problem model behind this section. 
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2. MM Model with Corporate Taxes8 
As the interest payments are tax deductible, so debt financing is preferred to equity 
because it provides tax shield. Since the gain from leverage increases as debt 
increases, in theory a firm’s value is maximized at 100 percent debt financing.  
Although MM included corporate taxes in the second version, they did not extend the 
model to include personal taxes. In addition, 100 percent debt financing is impossible 
in the real world. Because if the firm used 100 percent debt financing, the debt-
holders would own the entire company, thus, they would have to bear all the business 
risk. If the debt-holders bear all the risk, then the debt-holders should be equity-
holders to the firms; the interest rate on the debt should be equal to the equity 
capitalization rate at zero debt.  
Implications behind the MM model with corporate taxes:  
z Since corporations can deduct interest payments but not dividend payments, 
corporate leverage lowers tax payments.  
z The cost of equity rises with leverage, because the risk to equity rises with 
leverage. 
                                            
8 Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of 
Capital: A Correction. American Economic Review 53, no.3 (1963), pp.433-92. 
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3. Miller Model with Corporate and Personal Taxes9 
The Miller model provides and estimates of the value of a levered firm in a world 
with both corporate and personal taxes. 
VL= VU+ D {1- (1-TC )(1-TS )/(1-TD )}  
Here VL designates the value of leveraged firm and VU designates the value of 
unlevered firm; D designates the amount of debt the firm uses; TC designates the 
corporate tax rate; TS as the personal tax rate on income from stocks, and TD as the 
personal tax rate on income from debt.     
 In general, whenever the effective personal tax rates on income from stock is less 
than the effective rate on income from bonds; the Miller model produces a lower gain 
from leverage than MM with-tax model. In other words, Miller’s work does show that 
personal taxes offset some of the benefits of corporate debt.   
Criticisms of the MM and Miller Models  
z Both MM and Miller assume that personal and corporate leverage is perfect 
substitute. However, many institutional investors cannot legally borrow to buy 
stock, hence are prohibited from engaging in homemade leverage.  
z Homemade leverage puts stockholders in greater danger of bankruptcy than does 
corporate leverage. 
                                            
 
9 Miller, Merton. Debt and Taxes. Journal of Finance 32 (1977), pp.261-97. 
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z Brokerage and other transaction costs do exist. 
z Corporations and investors borrow at the different rate.  
z The interest tax shield from corporate debt is more valuable to some firms than to 
others. 
z MM and Miller ignore agency costs and financial distress. 
4. The Trade-off Models with Bankruptcy Costs10 
1) Risk, Financing Pattern and Optimal Capital Structure 
The decision as to how much debt and equity a firm should have is extremely 
important. Using more debt raises the riskiness of the firm’s earnings stream. 
However, a higher debt ratio generally leads to a higher expected rate of return. The 
higher risk associated with greater debt tends to lower the stock’s price,     
Risk consists of unsystematic risk and systematic risk. Unsystematic risk is also 
known as company-specific, or diversifiable risk, is caused by such random events as 
lawsuit, strikes, successful and unsuccessful marketing programs, winning or losing a 
major contract and other events that are unique to a particular firm. Systematic risk is 
also known as market risk, or non-diversifiable risk, or beta risk, it is the risk that 
                                            
10  Eugene F. Brigham, Louis C.Gapenski, and Michael C.Ehrhardt. Financial 
Management. Fort Worth: the Dryden Press, 1999. 
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remains after diversification, such as war, inflation, recessions and high interest rates, 
those affects most firms.  
Unsystematic risk consists of business risk and financial risk. Conceptually, the firm 
has a certain amount of risk inherent in its production and sales operations; this is its 
business risk. Business risk associated with projections of a firm’s future returns on 
assets, or return on equity if the firm uses no debt. Business risk varies from industry 
to another and also among firms in a given industry. Furthermore, business risk can 
change over time. Business risk depends on a number of factors, such as demand 
variability, sales price variability, input price variability, ability to adjust output prices 
form changes in input prices and the extent to which costs are fixed (operation 
leverage). 
Financial risk is the additional risk placed on the common stockholders as a result of 
using financial leverage, which results when a firm uses fixed-income securities (debt 
and preferred stock) to raise capital. A firm intensifies the business risk borne by the 
common stockholders when financial leverage is created through the use of debt and 
preferred stock. High financial risk may induce bankruptcy or liquidation.     
A firm with high business risk tends to use less debt financing, which can reduce 
financial risk. A firm would face huge risk when has both high business risk and 
financial risk. So when manager make financing decision, they should fully consider 
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how much business risk they have, then reasonably arrange how much financial risk 
they should take, in order to keep the total risk at the rational level.  
Financing decision also affects the corporate capital structure. Managers should base 
on full consideration of determinations of capital structure, try to find their optimal 
capital structure, then according to optimal capital structure, to decide the financing 
decision.           
2) Limits to use of Debt 
In reality, the greater the use of debt financing, and the larger the fixed interest 
charges, the greater the probability that a decline in earnings will lead to financial 
distress, hence the higher the probability that costs associated with financial distress 
will be incurred. There also exist agency costs that include the lost efficiency plus 
monitoring costs in real world11.  
                                            
11 One agency relationship is between a firm’s stockholders and its bondholders. In the 
absence of any restrictions, management would be tempted to take actions that would 
benefit stockholders at the expense of bondholders. Since stockholders might try to 
exploit bondholder’s these and other way, bonds are protected by restrictive covenants. 
These covenants hamper the corporation’s legitimate operations to some extent. 
Further, the company must be monitored to ensure that the covenants are being 
obeyed, and the costs of monitoring are passed on to the stockholders in the form of 
higher debt costs. These will induce lost efficiency and monitoring cost, which 
increase the agency costs. 
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Financial distress and agency costs could cause the value of the leverage firm to 
decline as the level of debt rises. Therefore, the relationship between a firm’s value 
and its use of leverage has two negative components. So the firms value like this: 
VL= VU+ TC D-PV (Expected financial distress and agency costs) 
Here VL designates the value of leveraged firm and VU designates the value of 
unlevered firm; D designates the amount of debt the firm uses; TC designates the 
corporate tax rate, PV designates the present values of expected financial distress and 
agency costs.  
3) Implications of the Trade-Off Models 
z Firms with more business risk ought to use less debt than one with lower-risk, 
other things being equal. 
z Firms with more tangible, readily marketable assets can use more debt than 
one with more intangible assets. 
z Firms with higher tax rates ought to use more debt than one with lower tax 
rates. 
If the trade-off models are correct, we should find actual target structures that are 
consistent with the three points just noted. Further, we should find that firms within a 
given industry have similar capital structures, because such firms should have roughly 
the same types of assets, business risk, and profitability. In fact, the trade-off models 
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have very limited empirical support 12 . It does turn out that firms, which invest 
primarily in tangible assets, do tend to borrow more heavily than firms whose value 
stems from intangibles. However, empirical evidence refutes other aspects of the 
trade-off models. In other words, the trade-off models do not tell the full story.   
5. Pecking Order of Financing Model 
If the managers of firms view their stock was overvalued, then they tend to issue stock 
for financing; if the mangers view their debt was overvalued, they also tend to issue 
new debt to public for financing. Thus, investors are likely to price a debt issue and 
equity issue with skepticism. Investors are not willing to buy both debt and stock. The 
way managers get out of this problem is to finance projects out of retained earnings. 
So under this situation, firms prefer to finance projects with internally generated funds.  
If retained earning is insufficient and has to go to the external capital market, it will 
first issue debt and then convertible bonds. Common stocks will be issued only as a 
last resort. This financing hierarchy is known as the pecking order of financing 
choices. Gordon Donaldson found this model in 196113. 
                                            
12 For examples of the empirical research in this area, see Robert A. Taggart, JR. A 
model of Corporate Financing Decisions. Journal of Finance , December 1977, 1467-
1484; and Paul Marsh. The Choice between Equity and Debt: An Empirical Study. 
Journal of Finance, March 1982, 121-144.  
13Gordon Dnaldson, Corporate Debt Capacity: A Study of Corporate Debt Policy and 
the Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity. Boston, Harvard Graduate School of 
Business Administration, 1961.  
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A substantial amount of empirical evidence supports the pecking order model. As a 
result, firms that were profitable in the past have relatively low high debt ratios.  
Implications of the pecking order model: 
z There is no target amount of leverage. Each firm chooses its leverage ratio based 
on financing needs.  
z Profitable firms use less debt. Since profitable firms generate cash internally, 
implying less need for outside financing.  
z Companies like financial slack. Because firms know that they will have to fund 
profitable projects at various times in the future. They accumulate cash today. But 
too much free cash may tempt managers to pursue wasteful activities. 
6. Information Asymmetry Model  
Professor Stewart Myers14 noted the inconsistency between Donaldson’s findings and 
the trade-off models, and that inconsistency led Myers to propose a new theory. This 
is called the signaling, or asymmetric information, theory of capital structure.  
Information asymmetry means that different groups of market participants have 
asymmetric information. Because of asymmetric information, investors know less 
about a firm’s prospects than its managers know. Further, managers try to maximize 
value for current stockholders, not new ones. Therefore, if the firm has excellent 
                                            
14 Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle. Journal of Finance, July 1984, 575-
592 
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prospects, management will not want to issue new shares, but if things look bleak, 
then a new stock offering would benefit current stockholders. Consequently, investors 
take a stock offering to be a signal of bad news; so stock prices tend to decline when 
new issues are announced. The net effect of signaling effects is to motivate firms to 
maintain a reserve borrowing capacity designed to permit future investment 
opportunities to be financed by debt if internal funds are not available.  
Implications of the information asymmetry model: 
z Company insiders know more about the company’s prospects than outside 
investors, in other word, information asymmetry exists.  
z We will observe what economists call adverse selection or lemons problem in 
financing market. Managers have the greatest incentive to sell stock when the 
stock is a lemon.  
z The adverse selection theory also provides an explanation for pecking order of 
financing choices.  
C. The Determinations of Capital Structure 
Many theoretical studies have shown that profitability, tangibility, tax, size, non-debt 
tax shields, growth opportunities, volatility, and so on affect capital structure. Here, 
we summarize the results of previous theoretical studies on these factors. 
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1. Profitability 
Although much theoretical work has been done since Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
no consistent predictions have been reached of the relationship between profitability 
and leverage. Tax-based models suggest that profitable firms should borrow more, 
ceteris paribus, as they have greater needs to shield income from corporate tax. 
However, pecking order theory suggests firms will use retained earnings first as 
investment funds and then move to bonds and new equity only if necessary. In this 
case, profitable firms tend to have less debt. Agency-based models also give us 
conflicting predictions. Jensen (1986) and Williamson (1988) define debt as a 
discipline device to ensure that managers pay out profits rather than build empires. 
For firms with free cash flow, or high profitability, high debt can restrain management 
discretion due to the nature of fixed liability of the interest payments.  
2. Tangibility 
On the relationship between tangibility and capital structure, theories generally state 
that tangibility is positively related to leverage. In their paper on agency cost, 
ownership and capital structure, Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that the agency 
cost of debt exists as the firm may shift to riskier investment after the issuance of debt, 
and transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders to exploit to the option nature of 
equity. If a firm’s tangible assets are high, then these assets can be used as collateral, 
diminishing the lender’s risk of suffering such agency costs of debt. Hence, a high 
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fraction of tangible assets is expected to be associated with high leverage. Also, the 
value of tangible assets should be higher than intangible assets in case of bankruptcy. 
Williamson (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1990) suggest leverage should increase with 
liquidation value and that leverage is positively correlated with tangibility.  
3. Tax 
The impact of tax on capital structure is the main theme of pioneering study by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). It is now widely accepted that tax plays an important 
role in corporate capital structure decisions. Firms with a higher effective marginal tax 
rate should use more debt to obtain a tax-shield gain.  
The tax deduction for depreciation and investment tax credits is called non-debt tax 
shields (NTDS). DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that non-debt tax shields are 
substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing and a firm with larger non-debt tax 
shields, ceteris paribus, is expected to use less debt. 
4. Size  
Many studies suggest there is a positive relation between leverage and size. Marsh 
(1982) finds that large firms more often choose long-term debt while small firms 
choose short-term debt. Large firms may be able to take advantage of economies of 
scale in issuing long-term debt, and may even have bargaining power over creditors. 
So the cost of issuing debt and equity is negatively related to firm size. Overall, larger 
firms with less asymmetric information problems should tend to have more equity 
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than debt and thus have lower leverage. However, larger firms are often more 
diversified and have more stable cash flow; the probability of bankruptcy for large 
firms is smaller compared with smaller ones, ceteris paribus. Both arguments suggest 
size should be positively related with leverage. Also, many theoretical studies 
including Harris and Raviv (1990), Stulz (1990), Noe (1988), Narayanan (1988), and 
Poitevin (1989), suggest that leverage increase with the value of company.  
5. Growth Opportunities 
Theoretical studies generally suggest growth opportunities are negatively related with 
leverage. On the one hand, as Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) show, if management 
pursues growth objectives, management and shareholder interests tend to coincide for 
firms with strong investment opportunities. But for firms lacking investment 
opportunities, debt serves to limit the agency costs of managerial discretion as 
suggested by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990). On the other hand, debt also has its own 
agency cost. Myers (1977) argues that high-growth firms may hold more real options 
for future investment than low-growth firms. If high-growth firms need extra equity 
financing to exercise such options in the future, a firm with excessive debt 
outstanding may forgo this opportunity because such an investment effectively 
transfers wealth from stockholders to debtholders. So firms with high growth 
opportunity may not issue debt in the first place and leverage is expected to be 
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negatively related with growth opportunities. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also 
suggest that leverage increase with lack of growth opportunities. Because the firms 
with lack of growth opportunities may not need to finance, managers tend to swap 
equity for debt in order to increase the earning per share. If the prospects of firms are 
bleak, managers have to borrow the money when the cash flow is not sufficient for 
firms.    
6. Volatility 
Volatility or business risk and financial risk are, the proxy for the probability of 
financial distress and generally expected to be negatively related with leverage. 
Several measures of volatility are used in different studies, such as the standard 
deviation of the return on sales (Booth et al., 2001), standard deviation of the first 
difference in operating cash flow scaled by total assets (e.g., Bradley et. al., 1984; 
Chaplinsky and Niehaus, 1993; and Wald, 1999), or standard deviation of the 
percentage change in operating income (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988). All these 
studies find that business risk is negatively correlated with leverage.  
7. Ownership Structure and Managerial Shareholdings 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986) etc.) suggests that the 
optimal structure of leverage and ownership may be used to minimize total agency 
costs. They propose two types of conflicts of interest: conflicts between shareholders 
and managers, and conflicts between shareholders and debtholders. So it is expected 
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that there are some correlation between ownership (including managerial ownership) 
structure and leverage. Theoretically, Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that leverage is 
positively correlated with the extent of managerial equity ownership. Wald (1999) 
finds that, in Germany, a small number of professional managers control a sizable 
percentage of big industrial firms’ stocks (such as Siemens and Daimler-Benz) and 
can force management to act in the stockholders’ interests. Based on this fact, he 
argues that such centralized company control is responsible for the negative 
coefficient on size. 
Managers have an incentive to steer their firms in directions that enhance their own 
career opportunities and limit their risks. So managers may prefer to take less than the 
optimal level of debt because additional debt increases the risk of bankruptcy and 
limits a manager’s discretion. On the other hand, managers may prefer investments 
that enhance their own human capital. Since the compensation of managers is 
positively correlated with the size of firms. Therefore, managers have incentive to 
build corporate empire by borrowing more.  
8. Conclusions  
We summarize the main variables suggested by theory, which are usually thought to 
influence a corporate capital structure.  
Insert table 1 here 
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III. Further Discussions on the Capital Structure Theory 
 
A. For Whom Does the Capital Structure Matter? 
1. Optimal Capital Structure for the Shareholder 
The shareholder model takes the maximization of shareholder value as the primary 
objective of company. People who hold this proposition believe that the firm should 
belong to shareholders. Shareholders can get profits from the firms after pay off the 
requirement of the other stakeholders. According to this position, maximizing the 
shareholders value has to guarantee maximizing the stakeholders’ value. But this 
model does not consider the principal/agent problem that arises from the separation of 
ownership and control in the modern company. The shareholder model is essentially a 
creation of market expectation because it seems doubtful that there is any duty 
imposed on directors to maximize the shareholder value.     
2. Optimal Capital structure for the Stakeholder15 
The stakeholder model of capital structure suggests that the way in which a firm and 
its non-financial stakeholders interact is an important determinant of the firm’s 
                                            
15 Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy. New 
York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2002. pp. 597-604 
 
 33 
optimal capital structure. The purpose of optimal capital structure is to maximize 
stakeholders’ value. 
The stakeholder model takes a broader view of a company in which it is viewed as 
being responsible to a wider constituency. The nature of a stakeholder’s interest in a 
company differs from that of a shareholder in that (a) there is no convenient unit for 
measuring stakeholder interest analogous to the role performed by the company share 
(b) there is no presumption of equality between different stakeholders.   
In common law legal systems, the tendency has been for the shareholder model to 
predominate, but within that there have been, at different stages in the history of the 
company, differing perceptions of the respective roles of the shareholders and the 
board of directors.     
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IV. Empirical Analyses on the Financing Patterns 
 
On  the relationship between factors and companies’ capital structure, Harris and 
Raviv(1990), summarizing a good number of empirical studies from US firms, 
suggest that “leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, investment 
opportunities and firm size and decrease with volatility, advertising expenditure, the 
probability of bankruptcy, profitability and uniqueness of the product.” Here, we 
summarize the results of previous empirical studies on these factors. 
A. Profitability 
In contrast to theoretical studies, most empirical studies show that leverage is 
negatively related to profitability. Friend and Lang (1988), and Titman and Wessels 
(1988) obtain such findings from US firms. Kester (1986) finds that leverage is 
negatively related to profitability in both the US and Japan. More recent studies using 
international data also confirm this finding (Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Wald 
(1999) for developed countries, Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Booth et al. (2001) for 
developing countries).   
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B. Tangibility 
Empirical studies confirm theoretical prediction that is tangibility is positively related 
to leverage, include Marsh (1982), Long and Malitz (1985), Friend and Lang (1988), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Wald (1999).   
C. Tax 
Although almost all researchers seem to agree that taxes must be important to 
companies’ capital structure. Firms with a higher effective marginal tax rate should 
use more debt to obtain a tax-shield gain. However, MacKie-Mason (1990) comments 
that the reason why many studies fail to find plausible or significant tax effects on 
financing behaviors, which is implied by Modigliani and Miller theorem, is because 
the debt/equity ratios are the cumulative result of years’ of separate decisions and 
most tax shields have a negligible effect on the marginal tax rate for most firms. Also, 
a certain portion of total liabilities does not have to pay any interest. Hence there is no 
tax-shield effect for that portion of total liabilities.  
D. Size 
Empirical studies, such as Marsh (1982), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999), 
and Booth et al. (2001), generally find that leverage is positively correlated with 
company size. While both Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Wald (1999) find that larger 
firms in Germany tend to have less debt, Wald (1999) finds that, in Germany, a small 
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number of professional managers control a sizable percentage of big industrial firms’ 
stocks (such as Siemens and Daimler-Benz) and can force management to act in the 
stockholders’ interests. Based on this fact, he argues that such centralized company 
control is responsible for the negative coefficient on size.  
E. Non-debt tax shields 
Empirical studies generally confirm theoretical prediction, which firms with high non-
debt tax shields (NDTS) are expected to use less debt. However, NTDS is highly 
correlated with tangibility, which is also expected to affect firms’ leverage. Wald 
(1999) uses the ratio of depreciation to total assets and Chaplinsky and Niehaus 
(1993) employ the ratio of depreciation expense plus investment tax credits to total 
assets to measure NDTS. Both studies find that leverage is negatively correlated with 
NDTS.  
F. Growth Opportunities 
Empirical studies predominately support theoretical prediction, which generally 
suggest growth opportunities are negatively related with leverage. The findings of 
Kim and Sorensen (1986), Smith and Watts (1992), Wald (1999), Rajan and Zingales 
(1955), and Booth et al. (2001) are consistent with the above theoretical prediction.   
G. Volatility 
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Theoretical studies find that business risk is negatively correlated with leverage. In 
the empirical studies, Mackie-Mason (1990) and Saa-Requejo (1996) confirm this 
prediction.  
H. Ownership Structure and Managerial Shareholdings 
Empirical studies produce mixed results for the relationship between leverage and 
ownership structure: for example, Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) confirm such 
positive correlation, while Friend and Lang (1988) give opposite results. Although 
ownership structure is believed to have impact on capital structure, there seems no 
clear predication about the relationship between ownership structure and leverage.  
As mentioned before, Wald (1999) finds that, in Germany, a small number of 
professional managers control a sizable percentage of big industrial firms’ stocks 
(such as Siemens and Daimler-Benz) and can force management to act in the 
stockholders’ interests. Based on this fact, he argues that such centralized company 
control is responsible for the negative coefficient on size 
I.  Conclusions 
We summarize the empirical studies with a bearing on the application of these 
variables in modeling capital structure. The list of references is intended to be 
illustrative and certainly not comprehensive. 
Insert table 2 here 
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V. Practices of Financing Behaviors in the Real World 
 
Many factors influence a firm’s financing decisions. The factors’ relative importance 
varies among firms at any point in time and for any given firm over time, but any 
company planning to raise new capital should consider each of these points. This 
section will focus on the practices of financing behaviors casually observed in the real 
world both in the advanced and developing countries including China 
A. Financial Market Conditions 
Financial market provides the owners of financial assets with liquidation chance; 
liquidation ability is most important characteristic of financial assets. Financial 
market can reduce not only transaction fees of financial assets, but also information 
collection fees. We can classify financial market by different standards. For example, 
short-term capital market and long-term capital market, issue market and circulation 
market. Firm managers should consider the conditions of existing capital market when 
they make financing decisions, such as availability of various financial instruments, 
floatation cost, expertise of the investment bankers, information market efficiency and 
market liquidity, and so on, are relevant conditions. 
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B. Target Capital Structure and Floatation Costs 
Firms typically establish target capital structures, and one of the most important 
considerations in any financing decision is how the firm’s actual capital structure 
compares to its target structure. However, few firms finance each year exactly in 
accordance with their target capital structure, primarily because exact adherence 
would increase their floatation costs. Even through firms do tend to finance over the 
long period in accordance with their target capital structures, flotation costs have a 
definite influence on the specific financing decisions in any given year.  
C. The Firm’s Current and Forecasted Conditions 
If a firm’s current financial condition is poor, its managers might be reluctant to issue 
new long-term debt at unfavorable terms. Thus, firms in a currently weak financial 
condition but expecting future improvement would be tend to delay permanent 
financing until things improved. Conversely, a firm that is financially sound now but 
its   future prospects is not very positive would be motivated to finance long term now 
rather than to wait. These scenarios are based on the assumption that the capital 
markets are inefficient in the sense that investors do not have as much information 
about the firm’s future as does its management. This situation undoubtedly is true at 
times.  
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If the managers’ forecasts higher earnings than do most investors, the firm would not 
want to issue common stock. It would use debt, and then, after earnings had risen and 
pushed up the stock price, it would sell common stock to restore the capital structure 
to its target level.   
D. Restrictions in Existing Debt Contracts 
Debt covenants can influence a firm’s financing decisions. Restrictions on the current 
ratio, the debt ratio, and so on, can also restrict a firm’s ability to use different types of 
financing at a given time. 
E. Availability of Collateral 
Generally, secured long-term debt will be less costly than unsecured debt. Thus, firms 
with large amounts of general-purpose fixed assets are likely to use a relatively large 
amount of debt, especially mortgage bonds. Additionally, each year’s financing 
decision will be influenced by the amount of newly acquired assets that are available 
as security for new bonds. 
F. The time Value of Money: interest rates  
The time value of money is very important concept in corporate finance. The owners 
of currency wish to get some profit when they give up the use of money for period. 
The interest rate is the cost of capital. The time value of money is a most important 
factor of financing cost.   
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When making financing decisions, we also consider interest rate levels, both absolute 
and relative. For example, it is customary practices that, when the long-term interest 
rates are high by historic standards, financial manager would be reluctant to issue 
long-term debt and thus lock in those high costs for long periods. One solution to this 
problem is to use long-term debt with a call provision. Alternatively, a firm might 
finance with short-term debt whenever long-term rates are historically high, and then, 
assuming that interest rates subsequently fall, sell a long-term issue to replace the 
short-term debt. Of course, this strategy has its risks. If interest rates climb even 
higher, the firm will be forced to renew the short-term debt at higher rates, or to 
replace the short-term debt with a long-term bond, which costs more than it would 
have cost earlier. Of course, the firms do base their financing decisions on 
expectations about future interest rates. However, the success of such a strategy 
requires interest rate forecasts to be right more often than they are wrong, and it is 
very difficult to find someone with a long-term forecasting record better than 50-50. 
G. Credit Risk 
Credit risk is induced by creditor cannot fulfill the obligation of debt. One reason is 
that creditor’s business operation fall into a bad condition, the creditor cannot 
payback the debt at maturity. The required rate of return on investment would increase 
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when the credit risk is high, and therefore, the rate of return and credit risk show a 
positive correlation. 
For example, bonds are rated reflecting their probability of default. There are some 
rating agencies, such as Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s Corporation 
and so on. The firms should fully consider the credit risk rating from rating agencies, 
according to their specific situations to choose the best financing channel in order to 
lower the financing cost.  
H. Maturity Risk and Circulation Risk 
Equity financing can be considered to be a perpetual security with an infinite maturity. 
Debt maturities, however, are specified at the time of issue. One commonly used 
financing strategy is to match debt maturities with asset maturities. In recognition of 
this fact, firms do consider maturity relationships, and this factor has a major 
influence on the type of debt securities used. 
I. Other Relevant Factors  
In some countries, banking sector play a very important role in terms of financing for 
corporations. China has similar situation. Since the bond market is underdeveloped 
and most companies are not eligible to issue the equity. So these companies may use 
more debt financing than listed company. 
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As existing the agency problem, agency costs of equity can be viewed as an extension 
of the trade-off model. That is, the change in the value of the firm when debt is 
substituted for equity is the difference between (1) the tax shied on debt and (2) the 
increase in the costs of financial distress (including the agency costs of debt). Now, 
the change in the value of the firm is (1) the tax shield on debt plus (2) the reduction 
in the agency costs of equity minus (3) the increase in the costs of financial distress 
(including the agency costs of debt). The optimal debt-equity ratio would be higher in 
a world with agency costs of equity than in a world without these costs.16   When we 
make financing decision, we also should consider the effective tax rate and expected 
tax rate in the future, firms with higher marginal tax rate tends to use more debt.  
As discussed in the previous section, governance aspect also affect the financing 
decision, managers and old shareholders are unwilling to use equity financing, 
because they don’t want to dilute their power. When a firm use more debt financing, 
bankruptcy problem should be considered, since more debt may induces high 
financial distress, it can limit firm to use debt financing.  
 
 
 
                                            
16 Ross, Westfield, Jaffe, Corporate Finance, McGraw Hill, 6th edition,2002, pp.437 
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VI. Financing Pattern of Chinese Automobile Industry 
 
Since Modigliani and Miller published their seminal paper in 1958, the issue of 
capital structure has generated great interests among financial researchers. With 
respect to the theoretical studies, there are two widely acknowledged competitive 
models of capital structure: the tradeoff model and the pecking order hypothesis. It is 
important to test which hypothesis, tradeoff or pecking order, is more powerful in 
explaining firms’ financing behavior. The following sections will use the listed 
company of Chinese automobile industry; try to demonstrate the major characteristics 
of financing pattern of the automobile industry. 
A. The Highlight of Chinese Financial Market  
1. Money Market 
The money market in China consists of the inter-bank lending market, the negotiable 
instruments market and the Treasury bond repurchase market.  
Since January 3, 1996, a nationwide unified inter-bank lending market has been 
established.  It has linked all inter-bank markets across the country. The central bank 
regulates market interest rates indirectly.17 
                                                                                                                            
 
17 http://www.emeap.org:8084/RedBook/Cn/A1.htm#A. 
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The negotiable instruments market is the one in which commercial papers are the 
main instruments. Commercial paper activity commenced in 1981. In recent years the 
commercial paper market has developed steadily and the acceptance, discount and 
rediscount process has become standardized. Rediscounting has become an important 
instrument for indirect regulation by the central bank. 
On April 9, 1996, the central bank engaged in the open market transactions on the 
money market with treasury bills as the trading instrument. The object of the open 
market operation is controlling the liquid reserves of the financial institutions. Open 
market operations are conducted over the counter. Prices are determined by public 
bidding in terms of short-term repurchase.  
From 1997, the central bank enhances its ability to adjust the monetary base and 
decrease the proportion of direct planned financing. Open market counter-parties will 
also be expanded from commercial banks to other financial institutions to promote 
open market operations as one of the central bank’s major monetary policy 
instruments. As an important policy instruments of the central bank, the open market 
operations can be used frequently and flexibly to forecast and adjust the money supply.  
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2. Bond Market 
Market made a fresh start and developed rapidly. A bond market with government 
bond as its main part and corporate bond and financial bond coexisting has begun to 
take shape. A relatively standard market trading system has also been formed. 
Currently, China’s government bond market is playing an important role in channeling 
the pool of domestic saving to various economic activities. Over the past five years 
(1998-2002), government bonds totaling 2639 billion BMB were issued to boost the 
economy.  
Insert table 3 here 
The market for corporate debt is small. There were 12 companies issued corporate 
bond with 33 billion RMB in 2002. Comparing last year, there were only 10 
companies issued corporate bond with 25 billion RMB in 2001. This is a result of 
deliberate government policy. 18 
In China, we have no municipal bonds and local bonds, also lack for mortgage bonds 
and bond derivatives. The bond market is simply too small and offers too limited a 
selection of investments. The balance of the bond market currently stands at RMB 2.9 
trillion. Government bonds account for 69% of the total bond market, financial bonds 
account for 29% and corporate bonds less than 2%. Furthermore, almost 25% of the 
                                            
18 Sources from http://www.mof.gov.cn/display/index.jsp 
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bonds in issued as non-tradable treasury voucher bonds, so the tradable bond market 
actually stands at just RMB 2.2 trillion, approximately 25% of GDP. Comparing other 
country, 143% of GDP in USA, 136% in Japan, 95% of GDP for global average. 19   
3. Stock Market 
The Chinese stock market has been developing very quickly since 1990 and has now 
more individual stockholders than any country besides the United States. The Chinese 
stock market is the second largest in Asia, and stocks are traded on three different 
stock exchanges: The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE, established in 1914), The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE, established in 1990) and The Shenzhen Securities 
Exchange (SZSE, established in 1991). This paper focuses on stock market of 
Mainland China. We list the China’s stock categories as following:  
Insert table 4 here 
By the end of 2002, China’s total stock market capitalization (including A and B 
shares) was approximately 3.83 trillion RMB, which account for 37.55 percent of 
GDP; 1223 listed companies with 1310 securities. But the tradable market 
capitalization was only 1.25 trillion RMB. 20 
                                            
19 Sources from http://www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRCSite/default.htm 
20 Sources from China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
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4. Comments and Conclusions 
Chinese companies traditionally focused so heavily on equity financing, since China’s 
capital market is immature. Basically, in China shares are cheaper to issue. In the 
developed world, corporate financiers tend to go for debt issuance first. But in China, 
poor corporate governance, low dividend payments, and shares that don’t confer 
genuine ownership rights mean that managers of listed company prefer equity 
financing than debt financing. Sometimes, they treat equity financing as free lunch. 
 
One possible reason is that Chinese firms prefer and have access to equity financing 
once they go public as most firms enjoy a favorable high stock price.  Also, the 
management prefers equity financing rather than debt financing because bond market 
is binding now. Another possible explanation is the fact that the Chinese bond market 
is still in an infant stage of development. Banks are the major or even the only source 
of firms’ external debt. As a result, firms have to rely on equity financing and trade 
credit, where firms owe each other in the form of accounts payable. In order to 
provide more financing opportunities for Chinese firms, it is desirable for China to 
accelerate the development of its bond market.    
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B. Hypotheses in Identifying determinants of optimal Capital Structure 
1. The survey of the capital structure of Chinese companies 
At December 31,2002, there were 1160 listed companies in China, 2926 billion RMB 
of total assets, 1628 billion RMB of total liabilities, 1548 billion RMB of turnover, 70 
billion RMB of net profit, 56 percent of debt ratio, 0.13 RMB of EPS. 21 
The capital structure of Chinese companies has some different features while 
comparing other developed countries. First, although the practice of GAAP varies 
across the world and a rigorous comparison in capital structure across countries is 
impossible, we have clear evidence that Chinese companies have less long-term debt, 
less total liabilities and higher shareholders’ equity compared to their counterparts in 
both developed countries and some developing countries. Second, Chinese companies 
tend to rely on higher levels of external financing, especially higher levels of equity 
financing than those in other developed countries. Third, the difference between book 
value and quasi-market value of leverage is much bigger in China than that in other 
countries.  
2. Hypotheses  
In order to identify determinants of the Capital Structure, we first should make some 
hypotheses under fully considering relevant factors.    
                                            
21 Sources from China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
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1) Tax System  
China’s entry to the WTO will motivate several important tax reforms that will 
restructure China’s tax system in line with international tax practices. The major 
reforms will be in the areas of value-added taxation, income taxation, and customs 
duties. 
The major change to be seen in the VAT will result in its transformation from a 
productive value-added tax into consumptive value-added tax. Currently, businesses 
cannot claim a deduction for capital purchases. Following reform, China’s VAT will 
allow a credit for taxes paid on purchase of fixed assets such as equipment and 
machinery. But according to current documents of State of Administration of Taxation, 
the VAT rate will not change in short-term. The effective VAT rate is 17%. Reform of 
the enterprise income tax will involve integration of the tax on domestic and foreign 
businesses. Currently, foreign businesses are taxed at a lower rate (20% and 30%) 
than domestic businesses (33%). According to some relevant data, we estimate that 
the income tax rate will be changed to 30% in the next five years. 
China has promised to lower its customs duties in several areas. Beginning in January 
2002, China’s general tariff level dropped from 15.3% to 12%. According to 
agreement of WTO, the automobile tariff will be dropped from 70-80% in 2001 to 20-
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30% in 2006. The quota of automobile import will be cancelled after four years 
later.22 
Since the automobile tariff will be dropped, the price of importing automobile 
production also will be dropped. It may give more pressure to domestic automobile 
companies. Some of them may increase the demand of financing to update their 
production line, try to lower the production cost. Competitions in Chinese automobile 
industry will serious year by year. Some companies may choose conservative 
financing policy due to the serious competition; competition may increase both the 
business risk and probability of default. So they are unwilling to use debt financing 
since unpaid debt is a liability of the firm. If it is not paid, the creditors can legally 
claim the assets of the firm. This action may result in liquidation and bankruptcy. 
Meanwhile, other companies with strong competitiveness would use both debt and 
equity financing to enlarge their scales and market. 
2) Industrial Policy 
In March 2001, China released the PRC Outline of the 10th Five-Year Plan (FYP) for 
National Economic and Social Development. As part of this process, government 
units from across China formulated specific administrative industrial and 
development plans for the years 2001-2005. In June 2001, the State Economic and 
                                            
22 Sources from State Taxation Administration of PRC 
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Trade Commission (SETC) issued the FYP report giving an overview of the 
automobile industrial sector. 
According to automobile yearbook of 2002, China’s automobile industry in 1999 
included 2,391 enterprises and employed 1.8 million people. In 2001, sales revenue of 
the industry hit RMB234.7 billion, with profits reaching RMB28.9 billion  
Total automobile output is projected to greatly increase in the next five years. In 2005, 
total output is forecasted to be about 3.2 million, including 1.1 million sedans. Value-
added industrial output will be RMB130 billion (USD15.7 billion) and is set to 
account for 1 percent of the national GDP. Automobile exports are expected to 
account for 8% of sales revenue. Total motorcycle output is forecasted around 13 
million, and motorcycle exports will account for 15-20% of sales revenue.23 
The 10th FYP also includes ambitious goals for organizational and production 
restructuring. Policy goals include: 
“The establishment of two to three large, internationally competitive automobile 
enterprise groups by 2005. These large enterprise groups will have over 70% of 
market share, and sales and after-sales service systems will be in conformity with 
international practice. Five to ten large automobile components enterprise groups with 
primary competitive ability will be built, with the top three producers of key 
                                            
23 Sources from the 10th five year planning of Chinese automobile industry 
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components obtaining 70% of the domestic market. Components exports should 
account for 20% of these companies’ total sales. Three to four motorcycle enterprise 
groups with comparatively strong international competitiveness will be established as 
well.” 
Under such industry policy, merger and acquisition are unavoidable. Actually, we 
have three big groups in China, which are Yiqi, Shangqi and Dongfeng. But the scales 
of these three groups are very small comparing to international automobile industry. 
This policy can accelerate the development of M & A in Chinese automobile industry. 
The automobile component industry also has same problem as the automobile 
industry. So the acquirer may increase the demand of financing in order to pursue the 
economics of scale by M & A.      
3) Financial Policy 
According to the national long-term planning, until 2010 China’s GDP will be 
doubled based upon the amount of GDP in 2000. In other words, the GDP annual 
growth rate is about 6.5 percent from 2001 to 2020. 24 
Interest rates in China are currently set by administration. But Chinese government 
will gradually establish the market-oriented of interest rate system. According to the 
                                                                                                                            
 
24 Sources from the Report of The 16th national congress of the Communist Party of 
China 
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Laws of People’s Bank of China, the first objective of the monetary policy of central 
bank is to keep a stable policy of currency. From 2001 to 2020, the People’s Bank of 
China will keep employing the steady monetary policy. That means People’s Bank of 
China will continue to employ zero inflation or low inflation. Based on national 
planning of regulative target of estimating price, China’s annual inflation rate will be 
1.5-2.5 percent from 2001 to 2020. But we should consider the influence of economic 
periodicity and the capability of controlling of central bank. We may estimate that the 
annual inflation rate will be 3-4 percent during 2001 to 2020.      
But if we look at current situation, the effective demand is not enough to stimulate the 
economic growth. So Chinese government employed the active financial policy in 
recent years in order to maintain the growth in GDP. We can forecast that a moderate 
amount of monetary supply and bank loan will be increased by the central bank in the 
short term.  
Since the forecasting annual inflation rate is very low, and the interest rate have been 
decreased for many times by Chinese government, so the cost of debt financing is 
lower than before. It is good time for using debt financing.   
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4) Other factors 
There are some favorable factors for China’s economic growth currently. First, the 
policy environment will be more supportive of economic progress. The 16th national 
congress of the Communist Party of China, held late last year, has decided to build a 
well-off society in an all-round way over the coming two decades. Second, the 
positive contributions China’s WTO entry brings to its economic development will be 
further unleashed. Third, some new hot consumption sectors are expected to activate 
domestic demand, such as automobile, travel and housing sectors. These factors 
provide the wonderful conditions for corporate development. We will see a 
prosperous financing market future soon in China. 
C. The Status Quo Analysis of Automobile Industry 
1. Survey of Chinese Automobile Industry  
According to the yearbook of automobile industry, Chinese automobile industry still 
maintained rapid development in 2001; the amount of production and marketing hits 
the historical level. Compared 2000, China produces 2.334 millions automobiles with 
12.8 percent increase, sells 2.364 millions with 13.3 percent increase. An individual 
purchase has 60 percent market shares. 25   
                                            
25 Sources from the yearbook 2002 of automobile industry PRC 
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Through the 15 big groups data (108 manufactories), which are Beiqi, Tianqi, Shangqi, 
Yuejin, Yiqi, Jinbei, Dongfeng, Chongqi, Hafei, Jianglin, jinanghuai, Changhe, Wulin, 
Qingling, and Changan, we can see that the economic performance of automobile 
industry had a big improvement. In 2001, sales revenue is 234.7 billion RMB with an 
increase of 18.3 percent against previous year; total profit is 28.9 billion RMB with an 
increase of 29.7 percent; ROE rate is 8.9 percent; gross margin is 5.4 percent; debt 
ratio is 56.1 percent. 26 
2. Analysis of Financing Pattern and Capital Structure 
We pick up 9 listed companies, which main business scope is manufacture of 
automobile that belong to the 15 big groups of automobile industry mentioned before, 
and 10 listed automobile component companies.  Based on the annual report of year 
1999 to 2002, we get the financing pattern and the debt on equity ratio in each 
company.   
Inserts table 5 and table 6 here 
Inserts table 7 and table 8 here 
After we compared the figures of table 7 and table 8, the interesting thing is that the 
results are almost same, so we can get the following conclusions: 
                                            
26 Sources from the yearbook 2002 of Chinese automobile industry  
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z Accruals took about 5 percent on total assets in automobile industry from 1999 to 
2002. 
z Account payable took about 10 percent on total assets. 
z Short-term bank loan and long-term bank together took about 20 percent on total 
assets. 
z Commercial paper took less than 3 percent and corporate bond took less than 0.05 
percent on total assets. 
z Minority interests took about 2 percent on total assets and less than 9 percent 
financing come from other resources. 
z Common stock took 20 percent on total assets and 30 percent on reserves 
financing. So equity financing took more than 50 percent on total assets. 
z Short term financing took about 40 percent, which is near 60 percent financing 
come from long term. 
z EPS in automobile industry is more than 0.20 RMB during 1999-2002. 
z Total debt took about 50 percent on total assets. But long –term debt just took less 
than 10 percent. 
Now we look at the results of annual ratio on average in automobile industry year by 
year, we find another interesting things. 
Inserts table 9 and table 10 here 
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After we compared the figures of table 9 and table 10, we find that the annual ratios 
on average are almost unchanged year by year both in automobile industry and 
component industry. That is, the financial structure of automobile industry kept the 
relatively stable ratio from 1999 to 2002.  
3. Characteristics and Causes Analysis 
1) Equity financing took high percentage; the main reason is that China’s capital 
market is immature. As mentioned before, in China some managers treat the 
stock issue as free lunch. Once they have qualification for issuing new shares, 
they would prefer the equity financing to debt financing. There are three 
automobile companies issued new share to original shareholders during the 
period from 1999 to 2002, which are Shangqi in 1999, Beiqi in 1999 and Jinbei in 
1999. There are six automobile component companies issued new share to their 
original shareholders, which are Wangxiang, Xiangyang, Liheqi and Sihuan in 
1999, Yunnei and Dongan in 2000. 27 
Why equity financing took so high percent, why shares are cheaper to issue in 
China? The following explanations may solve this problem:  
Firstly, In China, according to the Corporate Law, there are some legal 
regulations on issuing new shares, such as the return on equity and dividend 
                                            
27 Sources from http://market.p5w.net/p5w/company/files/cutting.asp 
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payment should accord with certain standards, is there any illegal actions or not. 
But there is no legal responsibility of company to shareholders, by way of equity 
financing has less pressures imposed on firms than debt financing. The 
controlling shareholders will make any decisions what they like without 
considering minority shareholders. 
Secondly, the concentrated ownership exists in Chinese stock market. The largest 
shareholder, who is usually the state, holds about 45 percent28 total shares on 
average in a listed company. Most shares held by controlling shareholders cannot 
be listed and traded in the stock markets. Because these shareholders still can 
keep the controlling position after seasoned equity offerings and the offering 
price is much higher than book value. The controlling shareholder benefit from 
increased book value of their shares from seasoned equity offerings. It is also the 
case for right offerings while the controlling shareholders give up the right. In 
other words, the controlling shareholders may give up their rights in time of 
equity financing, but they still are largest shareholder even their share are diluted 
by new issue.  
Thirdly, once they go public, they will prefer equity financing, since the bond 
                                            
28 Sources from 
http://www.google.com/search?hl=null&q=making%20companies%20as%20better%
20citizens:%20advancing%20corporate%20governance%20in%20china 
 60 
market is immature in China as mentioned before. 
Finally, this phenomenon also demonstrates that the pecking order model is less 
powerful in explaining firms’ financing behaviour.  
2) Small percent on long-term debt financing. One possible reason is due to the 
financial policy. That is, it is not easy to get long-term bank loan for the company. 
At the same time, to issue the corporate bond is not available for most companies 
under the current financial policy.  
3) There are 40 percent financing come from the short-term debt. If we look inside, 
more than 10 percent ST bank loan financing may also due to the financial policy. 
That is, it is not difficult to get ST bank loan for company comparing LT debt. 
Small percent on commercial paper financing is the best example of under-
developed commercial paper market in China.   
4) The annual ratio of financing pattern is almost same as industry average ratio, this 
also demonstrate that firms within a given industry have similar capital structures, 
because such firms should have roughly the same types of assets, business risk, 
and profitability. It is best example of that the trade-off model can explain the 
firms’ financing behaviour.  
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D. The effects of China’s WTO Entry on Automobile Industry 
Before China entry to WTO, automobile industry of China is so strongly protected by 
government policy, which included the high customs duties of import and protected 
policies of non-customs-duty, furthermore, automobile industry strongly interact with 
other relative industry. All in all, comparing advanced level of other countries, the gap 
is very clear. China entry to the WTO will deeply affect China’s automobile industry, 
to force it more open further than before. 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) will have a major impact on 
the Automobile Policy. The Working Party Report contains a commitment by China to 
the effect that the Automobile Policy will be brought into line with China WTO 
commitments. Consequently, much of the way China has regulated the sector will 
have to change. 
Insert table 11 here 
It is quite difficult to project what the effects of WTO Membership on China will be.  
What is quite clear, however, is that the Chinese automobile market represents one of 
the hottest – if not the hottest – business niches in the world. 
We may get some prediction on how the legal commitments of the WTO will affect 
the automobile industry in China. 
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1. Supply Chain Competitiveness: 
Prices for domestically produced automobiles in China have been high by any 
standards. A number of different factors have contributed to this high price, including 
import duties on components and components for assembly and the high cost of 
domestically produced parts. Because of gradually lowering duties and the influx of 
foreign made automobiles, local manufacturers are going to insist that their suppliers 
reduce costs. If the local suppliers cannot reduce their costs, then the parts and 
components will be imported. This effect may induce the firms’  increase the 
demand of financing, to update or enlarge their production line; the cost may be 
reduced under mass production. This must increase the competition among 
automobile producers due to WTO entry.  
2. Dumping Suits: 
It is not inconceivable that Chinese manufacturers will commence dumping actions in 
China against foreign made automobiles and trucks. The pricing of imported 
automobiles is remarkable close to that of domestically made vehicles, even though 
tariffs are still quite high and there is an additional value added tax of 17% added to 
the final price. 
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3. Development of Distribution Networks 
With the vast number of new companies that will be formed and allowed to trade, it is 
likely that both foreign and domestic manufacturers of automobile will look to add 
more and more distributors to their list of customers.  
4. Increase in Vehicles Available:  
Because of the increased quota for foreign automobiles and the fact that existing 
manufacturers will be free to produce products of their own choosing, it is highly 
likely that WTO will see a proliferation of vehicles on the road. 
5. Increase in Automobile Credit Enterprises:  
Barely noticed in the WTO deals are provisions to allow foreign automobile makers 
to offer automobile loans in China. This area of the automobile industry has the 
potential to be extremely lucrative, as it will not be subject to the inefficiencies of 
production and trade.  
6. Summary  
The China’s WTO entry brings both great opportunity and great risk to Chinese 
automobile industry. Since the more and more foreign producers will entry to Chinese 
automobile market, competition will become serious gradually. Bankruptcy 
probability of firms with small and medium sized will much bigger than before. As an 
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alternative, most of them would be merged by others. In history, there had more than 
2000 automobile firms in USA, but now, less three firms exist in American market.     
 
With China’s WTO entry, we should liberalize financial market in China in the future. 
In order to fulfill the development of economy and international demand, we need 
financial reform, not only in the attitude but also in the action. It is time to accelerate 
the development of Chinese bond market, to standardize the Chinese stock market, to 
reduce the government power and to enlarge the market power. The roles of 
government should increase the financing resources for company instead of direct 
regulation. These reforms will change the firms’ financing behavior either in the 
automobile industry or other fields. As Chinese government is moving toward more 
liberalized economy and financial market, managers would more rational when they 
make financing decisions, they would increase bond financing and keep debt ratio at 
the reasonable level in the future.    
E. Seeking Optimum Capital Structure and Financing Pattern 
In this section, we first present some results of empirical analysis on the determinants 
of capital structure, which are made by Samuel G.H. Huang and Frank M. Song at 
2001, those results were calculated through 799 listed companies. Generally their 
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results29 are consistent with the predictions of theoretical studies and the results of 
previous empirical studies. Profitability is strongly negatively related with total 
liabilities. Non-debt tax shields are also highly negatively related with total liabilities. 
Volatility, size and ownership of institutes are positively related with total liability. 
Tax and management shareholding have no significant effect on total liabilities.  
Now we look into the financing pattern of Chinese automobile industry in our model. 
There only have two automobile-companies with 25 percent of debt ratio, which are 
600104 and 000800; the other seven automobile-companies had around 60 percent of 
debt ratio. It seems no clear evidence to show that profitability is negatively related 
with total liabilities. But when we look at the data of automobile-component industry, 
we got the same results as Huang and Song’s. That is, company that has higher EPS 
tends to have lower debt ratio.   
In general, the size of automobile-company is bigger than automobile-component 
company. In our model, 52.56 percent of debt ratio in automobile industry is greater 
than automobile component industry with 44.78 percent of debt ratio. So the 
automobile industry tends to use more debt than component industry.  
                                            
29  Samuel G.H. Huang, Frank M. Song, The Determinants of Capital Structure: 
Evidence from China, Hong Kong: 2002 
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On average, debt ratio of automobile industry in our model is about 50 percent from 
1999 to 2002. But it lower than average value of 1160 listed companies at end of year 
2001 that is 55.65 percent. 30  Generally speaking, automobile industry has more 
tangible assets than other industry. It can use more debt financing. Since if a firm’s 
tangible assets are high, then these assets can be used as collateral, diminishing the 
lender’s risk of suffering such agency costs of debt. Hence, a high fraction of tangible 
assets is expected to be associated with high leverage. Also, the value of tangible 
assets should be higher than intangible assets in case of bankruptcy. But there is a 
different result in reality. 
When we consider the hypotheses of identifying optimal capital structure at 
mentioned before, the GDP annual growth rate will be about 6.5 percent and annual 
inflation rate will be 3-4 percent during 2001 to 2020. Furthermore, China’s policy 
environment will be more supportive of economic progress. The domestic demand of 
automobile consumption will increase according to official forecast. Actually, Chinese 
automobile industry is facing both great development opportunity and pressure, since 
China is already a membership of WTO.  
The 10th FYP also design ambitious goals for organizational and production 
restructuring in automobile industry. So Chinese automobile industry will enjoy some 
                                            
30 Sources from China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
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benefit from the government policy, but this will not been keep for long period, 
because the agreements of WTO.  
What are our micro-countermeasure and macro-countermeasure for seeking optimal 
company capital structure? Based on above analysis, we found the trade-off model is 
more powerful in explaining firms’ financing behavior than pecking order model. The 
main reasons are listed in following:  
z In Chinese automobile industry, firms prefer equity financing than debt financing.  
z Every firm in automobile industry tend to have similar capital structure from 
1999 to 2002, annual ratios of automobile industry also tend to keep stable 
figures. 
But it is very hard to give the accurate conclusion about debt ratio. We can only give 
some qualitative analysis for seeking optimal capital structure.  
From the macro-countermeasure point of view, government should pay more attention 
to the development of corporate bond market and commercial paper market. It can 
offer more channels to company financing. As mentioned before section, Chinese 
bond market is still in an infant stage of development. Banks are the major or even the 
only source of firms’ external debt. As a result, firms have to reply on equity 
financing and trade credit, where firms owe each other in the form of accounts 
payable. In order to provide more financing opportunities for Chinese firms, the 
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corporate bond issuance quota needs to be relaxed to let more companies issue bonds, 
it is desirable for China to accelerate the development of its bond market.  
“The establishment two to three large, internationally competitive automobile 
enterprise groups by 2005. These large enterprise groups will have over 70% of 
market share. Five to ten large automobile components enterprise groups with primary 
competitive ability will be built, with the top three producers of key parts obtaining 
70% of the domestic market.” This industry policy clearly show us that the Chinese 
government attitude to automobile industry. So from the micro-countermeasure point 
of view, we give the following suggestions for seeking optimal capital structure. 
z Since there are 2401 firms in automobile industry as of December 2001,31 but 
most of firms’ scale are very small, so merger and acquisition is necessary for 
Chinese automobile industry development according to the experiences of 
advanced countries. Especially, for automobile component industry. Another 
reason is that the tariff level will dropped year by year, domestic automobile 
industry has less competition than foreigner automobile markers. M&A can 
strengthen the competition of Chinese automobile industry.  
In fact, China has formed three big automobile groups in automobile industry, 
which are Shanghai automobile, Yiqi and Dongfeng automobile. M&A can 
                                            
31 Sources from the automobile yearbook 2002 
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increase the size of firm, it may reduce volatility in business, and then the firm 
can use more debt financing. The EPS also can be increased following the 
leverage increase.  
z Because some foreign automobile makers have great interesting in Chinese 
domestic market, so money-losing companies with high debt ratio may employ 
the debt-equity swap. It can make the capital structure more reasonable; on the 
other hand, it also can improve the growth opportunity.      
z To increase the weight of long-term debt instead of short-term debt or equity 
financing, since the Chinese government employs the steady monetary policy and 
low inflation rate by forecast from 2000 to 2020.  
z Based on the theoretical results, firms that have experienced quick sales growth 
rate tend to have higher leverage while firms that have bright growth 
opportunities tend to have less leverage. But this suggestion should consider the 
detailed situations of each firm.   
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I. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we first discuss the theory of financing pattern and capital structure. 
Then focus on Chinese automobile industry, apply to the financing pattern and 
optimal capital structure, using typical automobile companies accounts data from 
1999 to 2002. This paper also intends to highlight the major characteristics of Chinese 
financial system and market. Our major conclusion is that Chinese listed firms in 
automobile industry rely heavily on equity financing, long-term bank loans and 
corporate bonds make little contribution to financing of the corporate sector. After 
entry to WTO, Chinese government should accelerate the development of bond 
market and commercial paper market; offer more opportunities to firm financing. 
Chinese automobile industry should widely use merger and acquisition to strengthen 
the firm’s competition. Money-losing firms with high debt ratio may employ the debt 
to equity swap from foreigner automobile makers. Trade-off model may have more 
powerful in explaining firms’ financing behavior, but it is very difficult to get the 
accurate debt ratio for firms.  
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Table 1. Summary of Theoretical Determinants of Debt Ratios. 
. 
 Firm Factor Impact on 
Leverage 
Reason Model Reference 
Positive Pecking order 
hypothesis 
Asymmetric 
information 
Myers (1984) Profitability 
Negative Enhances firm’s 
ability to borrow 
  
Size Positive Less vulnerable to 
bankruptcy 
Asymmetric 
information 
Myers (1984) 
Free Cash 
Flow 
Positive Pre-commitment Agency Jensen (1986) 
Growth 
opportunities 
Negative Under-investment 
problem 
Agency Myers (1977) 
Positive Collaterals Agency Jensen and 
Meckling 
(1976) 
Asset 
Tangibility 
Positive Reduces 
bankruptcy costs 
Transaction 
costs 
Williamson 
(1988) 
Risk Negative Bankruptcy costs Transaction 
costs 
Myers (1977) 
Corporate tax 
rate 
Positive Reduces corporate 
tax burden 
Taxation Modgliani & 
Miller (1963) 
Non-debt tax 
shields 
Negative Shields firm tax Taxation DeAngelo & 
Masulis (1980) 
Asset 
diversification 
Positive Reduces risk   
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Table 2. Summary of Empirical Studies 
 
Factor Expected 
Sign 
Theoretical Reference Empirical 
Positive 
Evidence 
Negative 
Profitability Positive 
Negative 
Rajan &Zingales 
(1995) 
Myers (1984) 
 Titman & 
Wissels(1988) 
Jensen & 
Meckling (1992) 
Size Positive Kim & Sorensen 
(1986) 
Firth (1995) 
Hussain (1997) 
Titman & 
Wissels(1988) 
Free cash 
flow 
Positive Jensen (1986) Shenoy and 
Koch (1996) 
Lowe, Naughton, 
& Taylor (1994) 
Growth 
opportunities 
Negative Myers (1977) 
Jensen (1986) 
Krishnan & 
Moyer (1996) 
Homaifar, Zietz & 
Benkato (1994) 
Asset 
tangibility 
Positive Myers (1977) Jensen & 
Meckling 
(1992) 
Thies & Klock 
(1992) 
 
Risk Negative Bradley, Jarrell & Kim 
(1984) 
 Mackie-Mason 
(1990) 
Saa-
Requejo(1996) 
Corporate 
tax rate 
Positive Modgliani and Miller 
(1963) 
Homaifar, Zietz 
& Benkato 
(1994) 
Krishnan & 
Moyer (1996) 
Non-debt tax 
shields 
Negative DeAngelo & Masulis 
(1980) 
Boyle & 
Eckhold (1997) 
Wiwattanakantang 
(1999) 
Inflation Positive BADM (2001)  BADM (2001) 
Bank 
liquidity 
Positive Dermirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic(1996) 
BADM (2001)  
Stock 
market 
development 
Negative Dermirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic(1996) 
 BADM (2001) 
 BADM: Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic (2001) 
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Table 3. Summary of Chinese Government Bonds Market 
 
Year
????
????
????
????
????
????
????
????
????
????
????
????
???
??
???
???
???
Government bonds market 
Annual Insurance BMB Billion
??
??
???
???
???
???
???
 
Sources: from the Ministry of Finance of PRC 
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Table 4. Summary of the China’s Stock Categories 
 
Type Description 
A-shares 
 
B-shares 
 
 
Legal person shares  
 
State shares 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H-shares  
 
Red-chips 
 
Domestically listed shares, denominated in local currency. 
Foreign investors may not own these shares.  
Domestically listed shares of China-incorporated 
companies, denominated in US$ in Shanghai and HK$ in 
Shenzhen.  
Roughly a third of every listed firm’s equity is transferred 
to domestic institutions and cannot be traded. 
Another third of equity is transferred to the state (central 
and local government departments, as well as SOEs wholly 
owned by the state). The ultimate owner is the State 
Council. Legal person and state shares are not tradable, 
though they can be transferred with permission from the 
CSRC. Alongside legal person shares, this practice allows 
the government to claim that share issuance is not akin to 
privatization. 
Shares of mainland registered companies listed in Hong 
Kong. 
Shares of companies registered overseas and listed abroad 
(principally in Hong Kong), having substantial Mainland 
interests and controlled by affiliates or departments of the 
Chinese government. 
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Table 5. Financing Pattern of Nine Listed Automobile 
Manufacturing Companies 
 
550 jiangling       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 1.4 2.96     3.14  3.92         2.86  
2 A. P/TA  6.09 7.86     9.44  11.35         8.69  
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 14.21 9.87 11.46 6.54       10.52  
4 Commercial paper/TA 1.76 2.13 0.4 0         1.07  
5 Others/TA 6.26 8.72 9.21 13.04         9.31  
Long-Term Financing      
1 Common Stock/TA 18.6 19.59 21.78 23.8       20.94  
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 34.98 32.27 24.27 15.66       26.80  
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0             -    
4 Reserves/TA 17.4 17.35 17.85 23.65       19.06  
5 Minority Interests/TA 1.25 1.33 1.64 2.04         1.57  
6 Others/TA -1.95 -2.08 0.81 0        -0.81  
   100 100 100 100    100.00  
 EPS  -0.21 0.06 0.12 0.33         0.08  
 TD/TA         64         62         54         51             58  
 Debt on Equity      178       171       118       111           145  
625 changan      
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 4.96 6 6.99 6.2         6.04  
2 A. P/TA  14.9 18.19 17.29 23.52       18.48  
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 13.47 11.87 8.88 4.32         9.64  
4 Commercial paper/TA 6.27 12.39 12.31 4.87         8.96  
5 Others/TA 7.2 6.2 8.7 11.41         8.38  
Long-Term Financing                 -    
1 Common Stock/TA 19.79 16.73 17.51 15.99       17.51  
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 11.37 5.85 2.39 2.15         5.44  
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0             -    
4 Reserves/TA 18.23 16.22 18.53 22.3       18.82  
5 Minority Interests/TA 3.49 6.07 7.11 8.82         6.37  
6 Others/TA 0.32 0.48 0.29 0.42         0.38  
   100 100 100 100    100.00  
 EPS  0.04 0.12 0.13 0.68         0.24  
 TD/TA         62         67         64         62             64  
 Debt on Equity      163       203       177       161           176  
800 yiqi       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 4.38 5.84 5.19 4.57         5.00  
2 A. P/TA  7.59 8.74 11.8 15.47       10.90  
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 2.98 4.65 7.25 4.89         4.94  
4 Commercial paper/TA 0.82 0.58 0.15 0.63         0.55  
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5 Others/TA 1.83 1.92 2.65 3         2.35  
Long-Term Financing      
1 Common Stock/TA 24.41 26.02 25.88 25.47       25.45  
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 0 0 0 0             -    
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0             -    
4 Reserves/TA 57.11 51.74 46.26 44.86       49.99  
5 Minority Interests/TA 0 0 0 0             -    
6 Others/TA 0.88 0.51 0.82 1.11         0.83  
   100 100 100 100    100.00  
 EPS  0.32 0.17 0.01 0.15         0.16  
 TD/TA         18         22         28         30             25  
 Debt on Equity        23         29         39         42             33  
927 tianqi                  -    
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 2.28 4.46 8.27 8.7         5.93  
2 A. P/TA  13.2 8.69 4.5 8.58         8.74  
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 15.59 15.37 20.15 15.63       16.69  
4 Commercial paper/TA 0 0 4.03 9.03         3.27  
5 Others/TA 6.71 4.83 4.36 9.9         6.45  
Long-Term Financing                 -    
1 Common Stock/TA 21.76 20.9 20.13 20.38       20.79  
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 20.24 15.14 12.15 10.87       14.60  
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0             -    
4 Reserves/TA 19.89 30.18 26.05 15.7       22.96  
5 Minority Interests/TA 0 0 0 0             -    
6 Others/TA 0.33 0.43 0.36 1.21         0.58  
   100 100 100 100  
 EPS  0.31 0.19 -0.06 -0.49        -0.01  
 TD/TA         58         49         54         63             56  
 Debt on Equity      140         96       117       170           131  
600081 dongfeng                 -    
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 3.6 2.9 8.1 5.03         4.91  
2 A. P/TA  10 7.3 6.7 11.47         8.87  
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 22 20.3 27.4 17.97       21.92  
4 Commercial paper/TA 0.2 3.2 7.1 5.13         3.91  
5 Others/TA 6.72 7.8 2.4 2.99         4.98  
Long-Term Financing      
1 Common Stock/TA 27.2 27.5 24.51 25.25       26.12  
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 0 0 0 0             -    
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0             -    
4 Reserves/TA 26.4 25.6 22.56 22.52       24.27  
5 Minority Interests/TA 3.47 2.6 1.04 1.94         2.26  
6 Others/TA 0.41 2.8 0.19 7.7         2.78  
   100 100 100 100    100.00  
 EPS  0.3 0.26 0.25 0.29         0.28  
 TD/TA         43         47         53         52             49  
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 Debt on Equity        75         88       112       109             96  
600104 shangqi       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 17.44 14.68 8.06 10.53       12.68  
2 A. P/TA  2.61 2.79 2.54 3.79         2.93  
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 2.42 6.7 4.88 1         3.75  
4 Commercial paper/TA 0.2 0.2 0.13 0.13         0.17  
5 Others/TA 1.92 3.5 4.58 3.26         3.32  
Long-Term Financing                 -    
1 Common Stock/TA 25.79 21.77 23.69 24.28       23.88  
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 0.25 2.41 3.09 1.7         1.86  
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0             -    
4 Reserves/TA 48.02 47.11 52.51 54.73       50.59  
5 Minority Interests/TA 0.22 0.19 0.11 0.09         0.15  
6 Others/TA 1.13 0.65 0.41 0.49         0.67  
   100 100 100 100    100.00  
 EPS  0.51 0.53 0.31 0.42         0.44  
 TD/TA         26         31         24         21             26  
 Debt on Equity        35         45         31         27             35  
600166 beiqi                  -    
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 4.79 2.97 1.63 0.37         2.44  
2 A. P/TA  28.86 25.07 18.8 22.17       23.73  
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 16.51 25.48 29.93 23.68       23.90  
4 Commercial paper/TA 1.35 2.57 6.31 6.3         4.13  
5 Others/TA 7.4 6.83 8.58 11.64         8.61  
Long-Term Financing                 -    
1 Common Stock/TA 14.05 11.98 9.93 8.75       11.18  
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 0.38 0.27 0.21 1.73         0.65  
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0             -    
4 Reserves/TA 23.66 22.53 24.05 24.87       23.78  
5 Minority Interests/TA 2.74 1.89 0.05 0.06         1.19  
6 Others/TA 0.26 0.41 0.51 0.43         0.40  
   100 100 100 100    100.00  
 EPS  0.4 0.32 0.37 0.45         0.39  
 TD/TA  62 65 66 66 65 
 Debt on Equity 164 190 194 196 186 
600372 changhe      
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA * * 0.39 1.08         0.74  
2 A. P/TA    16.83 20.89       18.86  
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA   19.21 17.43       18.32  
4 Commercial paper/TA  8.19 10.38         9.29  
5 Others/TA   5.89 5.49         5.69  
Long-Term Financing                 -    
1 Common Stock/TA   13.24 11.46       12.35  
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA   3.66 0         1.83  
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3 Corporate Bond/TA   0 0             -    
4 Reserves/TA   20.84 24.78       22.81  
5 Minority Interests/TA   11.66 8.47       10.07  
6 Others/TA   0.09 0.02         0.06  
     100 100    100.00  
 EPS    0.21 0.21         0.21  
 TD/TA    66 64 65 
 Debt on Equity   193 176 185 
600609 jinbei                  -    
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 3.21 -0.07 0.55 1.08         1.19  
2 A. P/TA  10 8.92 7.14 6.15         8.05  
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 24.64 16.47 24.47 38.58       26.04  
4 Commercial paper/TA 3 3.11 0 0         1.53  
5 Others/TA 11.51 20 26.21 19.11       19.21  
Long-Term Financing                 -    
1 Common Stock/TA 11.87 19.14 21.51 24.59       19.28  
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 10.72 5.53 1.95 1.86         5.02  
3 Corporate Bond/TA 1.27 1.27 0.31 0         0.71  
4 Reserves/TA 8.57 20.74 17.13 7.17       13.40  
5 Minority Interests/TA 7.83 0.27 0.59 1.17         2.47  
6 Others/TA 7.38 4.62 0.14 0.29         3.11  
   100 100 100 100    100.00  
 EPS  0.23 0.23 -0.76 0.01        -0.07  
 TD/TA  80 60 61 68 67 
 Debt on Equity 389 151 159 220 180 
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Table 6 Financing Pattern of Ten Listed Automobile-Component 
Listed Companies 
 
559 wangxiang       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 5.7 6.58 9.58 9.36 7.81 
2 A. P/TA  2.82 10.47 9.18 7.65 7.53 
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 0.88 9.86 5.3 6.36 5.60 
4 Commercial 
paper/TA 
0.28 0.29 0.33 0.46 0.34 
5 Others/TA 3.93 5.89 6.74 6.09 5.66 
Long-Term Financing      
1 Common Stock/TA 27.65 19.05 17.72 16.04 20.12 
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 0 0 0.63 3.09 0.93 
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0 0.00 
4 Reserves/TA 58.52 40.32 42.24 40.46 45.39 
5 Minority 
Interests/TA 
0 6.93 7.29 9.73 5.99 
6 Others/TA 0.22 0.61 0.99 0.76 0.65 
   100 100 100 100 100.00 
 EPS  0.42 0.52 0.33 0.36 0.41 
 TD/TA  13.77 31.94 40.01 43.48 32.30 
 Debt on Equity 15.97 46.93 66.69 76.93 51.63 
        
622 yueyang       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 2.29 2.96 2.34 1.19 2.20 
2 A. P/TA  5.31 5.5 7.32 8.74 6.72 
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 16.3 17.55 25.1 31.5 22.61 
4 Commercial 
paper/TA 
0.48 0.63 0.36 2.34 0.95 
5 Others/TA 7.85 10.78 12.14 10.37 10.29 
Long-Term Financing      
1 Common Stock/TA 25.72 30.02 28.86 28.86 28.37 
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 14.86 13.64 7.98 8.74 11.31 
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0 0.00 
4 Reserves/TA 22.22 14.53 12.2 4.07 13.26 
5 Minority 
Interests/TA 
3.99 3.7 3.37 3.56 3.66 
6 Others/TA 0.98 0.69 0.33 0.63 0.66 
   100 100 100 100 100.00 
 EPS  0.13 0.1 0.05 0.03 0.08 
 TD/TA  52.17 55.5 59.04 67.07 58.45 
 Debt on Equity 109.07 124.72 144.14 203.67 145.40 
        
678 xiangyang       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
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1 Accruals/TA 4.94 3.7 4.8 6.89 5.08 
2 A. P/TA  5.15 5.25 4.47 4.29 4.79 
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 15.71 12.14 10.64 10.53 12.26 
4 Commercial 
paper/TA 
0.7 1.03 1.06 0.47 0.82 
5 Others/TA 4.32 3.98 5.69 17.43 7.86 
Long-Term Financing     0.00 
1 Common Stock/TA 13.77 13.84 16.17 17.87 15.41 
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 19.91 21.68 21.91 14.42 19.48 
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0 0.00 
4 Reserves/TA 35.23 38.28 35.16 27.95 34.16 
5 Minority 
Interests/TA 
0 0 0 0 0.00 
6 Others/TA 0.27 0.1 0.1 0.15 0.16 
   100 100 100 100 100.00 
 EPS  0.22 -0.4 -0.65 -0.6 -0.36 
 TD/TA  50.97 48.3 48.61 54.12 50.50 
 Debt on Equity 103.96 93.42 94.59 117.96 102.48 
        
903 yunnei       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 1.13 5.15 8.27 7.48 5.51 
2 A. P/TA  13.69 9 9.35 11.53 10.89 
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 13.92 8.91 11.19 7.24 10.32 
4 Commercial 
paper/TA 
0.79 0.68 0.04 0.08 0.40 
5 Others/TA 6.65 2.42 1.43 2.57 3.27 
Long-Term Financing     0.00 
1 Common Stock/TA 22.26 21.39 20.15 18.33 20.53 
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 4.86 0 0 0 1.22 
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0 0.00 
4 Reserves/TA 35.86 51.4 48.73 52 47.00 
5 Minority 
Interests/TA 
0 0 0 0 0.00 
6 Others/TA 0.84 1.05 0.84 0.77 0.88 
   100 100 100 100 100.00 
 EPS  0.3 0.44 0.45 0.5 0.42 
 TD/TA  41.85 27.21 31.15 29.61 32.46 
 Debt on Equity 71.97 37.38 45.24 42.07 49.17 
        
600148 liheqi       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 9.32 8.92 5.93 4.93 7.28 
2 A. P/TA  4.2 3.43 4.54 7.61 4.95 
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 6.3 9.64 4.84 1.46 5.56 
4 Commercial 
paper/TA 
0.32 0 0 0 0.08 
5 Others/TA 5.38 4.91 6.7 6.49 5.87 
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Long-Term Financing     0.00 
1 Common Stock/TA 24.17 31.63 41.79 41.58 34.79 
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 13.73 13.86 10.89 4.39 10.72 
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0 0.00 
4 Reserves/TA 35.9 26.94 24.81 33.27 30.23 
5 Minority 
Interests/TA 
0 0 0 0 0.00 
6 Others/TA 0.68 0.67 0.5 0.27 0.53 
   100 100 100 100 100.00 
 EPS  0.55 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.20 
 TD/TA  40.08 41.42 33.13 25.11 34.94 
 Debt on Equity 66.89 70.71 49.54 33.53 55.17 
        
600178 dongan       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 9.22 11.62 9.04 8.16 9.51 
2 A. P/TA  6.2 10.19 11.83 13.59 10.45 
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 2.26 0.3 0 0 0.64 
4 Commercial 
paper/TA 
0 0 0 0 0.00 
5 Others/TA 10.97 4.76 8.65 9.12 8.38 
Long-Term Financing     0.00 
1 Common Stock/TA 24.18 25.48 23.21 21.07 23.49 
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 2.17 4.28 4.22 3.19 3.47 
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0 0.00 
4 Reserves/TA 43.99 39.87 42.61 44.65 42.78 
5 Minority 
Interests/TA 
0 0 0 0 0.00 
6 Others/TA 1.01 3.5 0.44 0.22 1.29 
   100 100 100 100 100.00 
 EPS  0.31 0.33 0.2 0.25 0.27 
 TD/TA  31.86 34.68 34.18 34.29 33.75 
 Debt on Equity 46.76 53.09 51.93 52.18 50.99 
        
600418 jiangqi       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA * * 6.32 5.35 5.84 
2 A. P/TA    15.25 14.46 14.86 
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA   3.57 0.99 2.28 
4 Commercial paper/TA  0.94 2.27 1.61 
5 Others/TA   6.5 8.65 7.58 
Long-Term Financing     0.00 
1 Common Stock/TA   18.79 14.42 16.61 
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA   4.85 1.39 3.12 
3 Corporate Bond/TA   0 0 0.00 
4 Reserves/TA   43.78 52.47 48.13 
5 Minority Interests/TA  0 0 0.00 
6 Others/TA   0 0 0.00 
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     100 100 100.00 
 EPS    0.39 0.58 0.49 
 TD/TA    37.49 33.1 35.30 
 Debt on Equity   59.97 49.48 54.73 
        
600623 luntai       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 4.32 6.84 9 7.49 6.91 
2 A. P/TA  8.91 8.62 8.11 10.23 8.97 
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 27.14 29.05 32.63 31.25 30.02 
4 Commercial 
paper/TA 
5.03 7.52 0.45 0.73 3.43 
5 Others/TA 9.79 11.6 17.14 23.67 15.55 
Long-Term Financing      
1 Common Stock/TA 11.55 12.27 19.58 15.73 14.78 
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 12.67 9.67 6.3 5.79 8.61 
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0.21 0.08 0 0 0.07 
4 Reserves/TA 17.24 11.61 5.01 2.12 9.00 
5 Minority 
Interests/TA 
1.03 0.94 0 2.7 1.17 
6 Others/TA 2.11 1.8 1.78 0.29 1.50 
   100 100 100 100 100.00 
 EPS  0 -0.48 0.02 0.07 -0.10 
 TD/TA  71.2 76.13 75.42 82.15 76.23 
 Debt on Equity 238.93 318.94 306.83 460.22 331.23 
        
600660 fuyao       
Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 1.91 4.54 3.47 1.75 2.92 
2 A. P/TA  5.27 4 2.95 2.97 3.80 
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 46.05 35.52 27.59 22.89 33.01 
4 Commercial 
paper/TA 
0.24 1.4 2.84 4.92 2.35 
5 Others/TA 5.02 5.26 6.29 5.36 5.48 
Long-Term Financing      
1 Common Stock/TA 22.76 20.4 21.74 23.03 21.98 
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 1.29 10.22 20.9 28.11 15.13 
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0 0.00 
4 Reserves/TA 9.95 14.99 11.63 9.91 11.62 
5 Minority 
Interests/TA 
5.18 0 0.41 0.33 1.48 
6 Others/TA 2.33 3.67 2.18 0.73 2.23 
   100 100 100 100 100.00 
 EPS  0.28 0.59 0.37 0.41 0.41 
 TD/TA  67.29 64.64 66.62 67.05 66.40 
 Debt on Equity 296.3 182.81 199.58 203.49 220.55 
        
600742 sihuan       
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Short-Term Financing 1999 2000 2001 2002  Average  
1 Accruals/TA 16.57 10.4 8.23 6.18 10.35 
2 A. P/TA  8.09 6.69 9.31 17.41 10.38 
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 0.76 0 0 4.28 1.26 
4 Commercial 
paper/TA 
0 0 0 0.89 0.22 
5 Others/TA 4.55 6.61 5.61 3.71 5.12 
Long-Term Financing     0.00 
1 Common Stock/TA 23.96 20.95 16.24 12.94 18.52 
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 0 0 0 0 0.00 
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0 0 0 0 0.00 
4 Reserves/TA 45.27 55.36 60.68 54.53 53.96 
5 Minority 
Interests/TA 
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
6 Others/TA 0.78 -0.04 -0.1 0.04 0.17 
   100 100 100 100 100.00 
 EPS  0.59 0.52 0.67 0.67 0.61 
 TD/TA  30.71 23.58 23.04 32.52 27.46 
 Debt on Equity 44.32 30.86 29.94 48.19 38.33 
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Table 7 Summary of Financing Analysis of Nine-Listed Automobile 
Manufacturing Companies 
 
Financing Analysis of Automobile industry (1999~2002 on average)     
Code of listed companies 550 625 800 927 600081 600104 600166 600372 600609 Average 
   Short-term Financing           
1      Accruals/TA 2.86 6.04 5.00 5.93 4.91 12.68 2.44 0.74 1.19 4.64 
2      A. P/TA  8.69 18.48 10.90 8.74 8.87 2.93 23.73 18.86 8.05 12.14 
3      ST-Bank Loan/TA 10.52 9.64 4.94 16.69 21.92 3.75 23.90 18.32 26.04 15.08 
4   Commercial paper/TA 1.07 8.96 0.55 3.27 3.91 0.17 4.13 9.29 1.53 3.65 
5      Others/TA  9.31 8.38 2.35 6.45 4.98 3.32 8.61 5.69 19.21 7.59 
            43.10 
    Long-term Financing           
1      Common Stock/TA 20.94 17.51 25.45 20.79 26.12 23.88 11.18 12.35 19.28 19.72 
2      LT-Bank Loan/TA 26.80 5.44 0.00 14.60 0.00 1.86 0.65 1.83 5.02 6.24 
3      Corporate Bond/TA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.08 
4      Reserves/TA 19.06 18.82 49.99 22.96 24.27 50.59 23.78 22.81 13.40 27.30 
5 Minority Interests/TA 1.57 6.37 0.00 0.00 2.26 0.15 1.19 10.07 2.47 2.67 
6  Others/TA  -0.81 0.38 0.83 0.58 2.78 0.67 0.40 0.06 3.11 0.89 
            56.90 
 EPS  0.08 0.24 0.16 -0.01 0.28 0.44 0.39 0.21 -0.07 0.19 
    TD/TA  57.58 63.66 24.55 55.99 48.63 25.50 64.98 64.84 67.33 52.56 
 Debt on Equity 145 176 32.99 131 95.88 34.58 186.04 184.69 180.24 129.60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 85 
Table 8 Summary of Financing Analysis of Ten Listed 
Automobile–Component Companies 
 
Financing Analysis of Automobile Component industry 
(1999~2002 on average) 
    
   559 622 678 903 600148 600178 600418 600623 600660 600742 Average 
short-term Financing            
1 Accruals/TA 7.81 2.20 5.08 5.51 7.28 9.51 5.84 6.91 2.92 10.35 6.34 
2 A. P/TA  7.53 6.72 4.79 10.89 4.95 10.45 14.86 8.97 3.80 10.38 8.33 
3 ST-Bank Loan/TA 5.60 22.61 12.26 10.32 5.56 0.64 2.28 30.02 33.01 1.26 12.36 
4 Commercial paper/TA 0.34 0.95 0.82 0.40 0.08 0.00 1.61 3.43 2.35 0.22 1.02 
5 Others/TA  5.66 10.29 7.86 3.27 5.87 8.38 7.58 15.55 5.48 5.12 7.50 
             35.55 
long-term Financing            
1 Common Stock/TA 20.12 28.37 15.41 20.53 34.79 23.49 16.61 14.78 21.98 18.52 21.46 
2 LT-Bank Loan/TA 0.93 11.31 19.48 1.22 10.72 3.47 3.12 8.61 15.13 0.00 7.40 
3 Corporate Bond/TA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 
4 Reserves/TA 45.39 13.26 34.16 47.00 30.23 42.78 48.13 9.00 11.62 53.96 33.55 
5 Minority Interests/TA 5.99 3.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.17 1.48 0.03 1.23 
6 Others/TA  0.65 0.66 0.16 0.88 0.53 1.29 0.00 1.50 2.23 0.17 0.80 
             64.45 
 EPS  0.41 0.08 -0.36 0.42 0.20 0.27 0.49 -0.10 0.41 0.61 0.24 
    TD/TA  32.30 58.45 50.50 32.46 34.94 33.75 35.30 76.23 66.40 27.46 44.78 
 Debt on Equity 51.63 145.40 102.48 49.17 55.17 50.99 54.73 331.23 220.55 38.33 109.97 
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Table 9 Summary Annual Ratios on Average (1999~2002) of Financing 
Analysis of Nine Listed Automobile Manufacturing Companies 
 
Automobile industry 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average 
1999-2002 
Accruals/TA 5.26 4.97 4.70 4.61 4.64 
A. P/TA 11.66 10.95 10.56 13.71 12.14 
ST-Bank Loan/TA 13.98 13.84 17.07 14.45 15.08 
Commercial paper/TA 1.70 3.02 4.29 4.05 3.65 
Others/TA 6.19 7.48 8.06 8.87 7.59 
     43.10 
Common Stock/TA 20.43 20.45 19.80 20.00 19.72 
LT-Bank Loan/TA 9.74 7.68 5.30 3.77 6.24 
Corporate Bond/TA 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.08 
Reserves/TA 27.41 28.93 27.31 26.73 27.30 
Minority Interests/TA 2.38 1.54 2.47 2.51 2.67 
Others/TA 1.10 0.98 0.40 1.30 0.89 
     56.90 
EPS 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.19 
TD/TA 51.59 50.46 52.25 53.04 52.56 
Debt on Equity 145.94 121.60 126.66 112.69 129.6 
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Table 10 Summary Annual Ratios on Average (1999~2002) of Financing 
Analysis of Ten Listed Automobile–Component Companies 
 
Component 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average  
1999-2002 
Accruals/TA 6.16 6.75 6.70 5.88 6.34 
A. P/TA 6.63 7.02 8.23 9.85 8.33 
ST-Bank Loan/TA 14.37 13.66 12.09 11.65 12.36 
Commercial paper/TA 0.87 1.28 0.60 1.22 1.02 
Others/TA 6.50 6.25 7.69 9.35 7.50 
     35.55 
Common Stock/TA 21.78 21.67 22.43 20.99 21.46 
LT-Bank Loan/TA 7.72 8.15 7.77 6.91 7.40 
Corporate Bond/TA 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Reserves/TA 33.80 32.59 32.69 32.14 33.55 
Minority Interests/TA 1.14 1.29 1.11 1.63 1.23 
Others/TA 1.02 1.34 0.71 0.39 0.80 
     64.45 
EPS 0.31 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.24 
TD/TA 44.43 44.82 44.87 46.85 44.777 
Debt on Equity 110.46 106.54 104.85 128.77 109.97 
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Table 11. Key Issues for the Automobile 
 Industry under the WTO Agreement 
 
Issue Current status Agreement proposals 
 
Import tariffs 80–100% on passenger 
automobiles; as low as 9% 
on some other vehicles 
Reduced to 25% for 
passenger automobiles by 
July 2006. Overall average 
cut to 10% by 2006. 
 
Import licensing 
requirements 
Quotas vary by year on 
number and value of 
imported vehicles; 27,000 
vehicle import licenses 
issued in 1999 
Raised limit to $6 billion 
worth of imports on 
accession, 15% annual 
growth until elimination in 
2005 
 
Local content requirements Various incentives to speed 
use of domestic components 
suppliers 
Elimination of local content 
requirements on accession 
Import arrangement rights Foreign enterprise cannot 
directly import vehicles 
Import rights granted within 
3 years of accession 
 
Distribution, retail, after 
sales service 
Automobile manufacturers 
must use Chinese 
distributors to sell their 
vehicles, and domestic 
firms to service them 
Distribution, sales and 
service rights for foreign 
firms phased in over three 
years 
 
Finance Chinese consumers have 
difficulty financing vehicle 
purchase using domestic 
bank loans 
Non-bank foreign firms can 
provide unrestricted 
automobile financing on 
accession 
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